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U.S. MIGRANT WORKER LAW: 
THE INTERSTICES OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Kati L. Griffith† 
INTRODUCTION 
The work visa program for temporary foreign workers in the United 
States is “not only the longest-running, but also the largest such program in 
the world.”1  Close to one million foreign workers receive work visas each 
year for both skilled and unskilled temporary jobs in the United States.2  
Nevertheless, the number of foreign workers laboring in the United states 
that do not have the legal documentation necessary to work in the United 
States (“undocumented migrant workers”) dwarfs the number of temporary 
foreign workers that receive visas to work in the United States 
(“documented migrant workers”).  As of 2008, there were an estimated 8.3 
million, mostly low-wage and low-skilled, undocumented migrant workers 
in the U.S. labor force.3  Some estimates suggest that the number of 
undocumented migrant workers in the United States may be even higher.4  
Thus, when discussing “migrant worker law,” the laws that affect 
undocumented migrant workers deserve special attention in the U.S. 
context.   
 
 †  Assistant Professor of Employment and Labor Law, ILR School, Cornell University.  The 
author would like to thank Amy Carroll, Lance Compa, Leslie Gates, Patricia Kakalec, Risa Lieberwitz, 
Anne Marie O’Donovan, and Dan Werner for their comments on prior drafts of this article and Ramon 
Rivera for his feedback on the H-1B visa program.  The author also would like to thank Azadeh 
Sakizadeh and Shawn Butte for their assistance on portions of the article.  A special thanks to Tamara 
Lee for her able research and editorial support.  All errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the 
author.   
 1. Andrew J. Elmore, Egalitarianism and Exclusion:  U.S. Guest Worker Programs and a Non-
Subordination Approach to the Labor-Based Admission of Nonprofessional Foreign Nationals, 21 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 521, 524 (2007) (citing Global Comm’n on Int’l Migration, Migration in an Interconnected 
World:  New Directions for Action 83 (2005), available at http://www.gcim.org/en/finalreport.html).   
 2. See Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Security, TEMPORARY 
ADMISSIONS OF NONIMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES:  2006, at 2 (2007).  For additional cites, see 
Elmore, supra note 1, at 523 n.1. 
 3. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States 
(2009), 12–17, available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf. 
 4. See generally Brad Knickerbocker, Illegal Immigrants in the US:  How Many are There?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 16, 2006, at 1. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793316
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Migrant workers, both documented and undocumented, are currently 
the subject of a significant amount of debate in the United State. Some of 
the concern centers on the treatment of low-wage migrant workers in low-
skill occupations.  A host of new studies and reports graphically depict how 
low-wage migrant workers too often work in unsafe conditions and suffer 
severe mistreatment from their employers.5  For example, a New York 
Times article revealed a host of alleged labor abuses that came to light in the 
aftermath of a large-scale immigration raid at a meatpacking company in 
May 2008.  The immigration raid resulted in the arrest of hundreds of 
workers suspected of using fraudulent documents to obtain employment.6  
A search warrant issued before the immigration raid detailed one occasion 
when “a floor supervisor had blindfolded an immigrant [worker] with duct 
tape” and “then took one of the meat hooks and hit the [worker] with it.”7  
While the incident reportedly did not result in “serious injuries” it 
represented the tip of the iceberg of alleged labor and employment law 
violations.8  Immigration agents also identified child workers, “some as 
young as 13.”9  These children reported that they were working “shifts of 
twelve hours or more wielding razor-edged knives and saws to slice freshly 
killed beef.”10  Other alleged labor and employment violations included 
complaints from migrant meatpackers of discrimination, sexual harassment, 
and wage and hour violations.11   
Not all of the concern over migrant workers, however, is focused on 
low-wage or undocumented migrant workers.  Some of it involves workers 
“who toil in air-conditioned offices [and] earn up to six-figure salaries.”12  
For instance, calls for increases in the number of visas for skilled temporary 
 
 5. See, e.g., Southern Poverty Law Center, Close to Slavery:  Guestworker Programs in the 
United States (2007); STEVE STRIFFLER, CHICKEN:  THE DANGEROUS TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S 
FAVORITE FOOD (2005); Human Rights Watch, Blood, Sweat, and Fear:  Workers’ Rights in U.S. Meat 
and Poultry Plants (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/usa0105/usa0105.pdf; LEON FINK, 
THE MAYA OF MORGANTON:  WORK AND COMMUNITY IN THE NUEVO NEW SOUTH (2003); Abel 
Valenzuela, Jr., Day Labor Work, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 307, 327 (2003). 
 6. Julia Preston, Immigrants’ Speedy Trials After Raid Become Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, 
at A12. 
 7. Julia Preston, After Iowa Raid, Immigrants Fuel Labor Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at 
A1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  See also Julia Preston, Meatpacker Faces Charges Of Violating Child Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 2008, at A16 (“The Iowa attorney general . . . brought an array of criminal charges for child 
labor violations against the owners and top managers of a meatpacking plant where nearly 400 workers 
were detained”). 
 10.  Id. 
 11. Preston, supra note 7.  See also Julia Preston, Meatpacker Is Fined Nearly $10 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 3009, at A22 (reporting on state fines for wage violations).  For another recent story 
about widespread labor and employment violations, see Sonia Nazario & Doug Smith, Workers Getting 
Soaked at Southland Carwashes, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at A1 (“[C]arwashers -- automotive beauty 
shops . . . often brazenly violate basic labor and immigration laws with little risk of penalty”). 
 12. Mitra Kalita, Most See Visa Program as Severely Flawed, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2006, at D01. 
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migrant workers in “specialty occupations,” such as information technology 
occupations,13 have fueled intense debate.14  In 2007 and 2008, Microsoft 
Chairman Bill Gates went to the U.S. Congress on behalf of business 
leaders to testify about the shortage of temporary work visas for skilled 
information technology workers and its effect on “America’s continued 
competitiveness in the global economy.”15  The proposals of Gates and 
others to increase the numbers of temporary work visas for skilled workers 
have received significant opposition, which has further intensified as the 
U.S. economy falters.16  Some commentators believe that employers pay 
foreign employees less than domestic workers17 and are disingenuous about 
the labor shortage.18  Similarly, fears exist that domestic workers will lose 
jobs and existing working conditions will deteriorate if the government 
issues more skilled worker visas.19   
At the heart of much of the current debate surrounding both skilled and 
unskilled migrant workers in the United States is whether, and to what 
extent, these workers have an effect on the wages and working conditions 
of domestic workers.  Studies on the effect of immigrant workers on labor 
standards for domestic workers arrive at “contradictory conclusions.”20  
Some find that migrant workers have increasingly “caused a major 
 
 13. Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Serv., Immigration:  Legislative Issues on 
Nonimmigrant Professional Specialty (H-1B) Workers-RL30498 7–8 (2007); Beauty and the Geek; 
Visas, THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 2008 (“Only 65,000 H-1B visas are awarded annually and they get 
snapped up within days of becoming available, most of them going to tech workers.”). 
 14. Todd H. Goodsell, Note, On the Continued Need for H-1B Reform:  A Partial, Statutory 
Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers, 21 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 153, 153 (2007) (“The legal entry 
of high-skilled foreign workers into the United States . . . also divided the nation.”). 
 15. Peter Elstrom, Gates to Senate:  More Visas, Businessweek.com, Mar. 8, 2007, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2007/db20070308_624948.htm; Moira 
Herbst, Microsoft:  Layoffs for Some, Visas for Others; The software giant that has pushed for more H-
1B visas faces tough questions as it lays off 5,000, Businessweek.com, Feb. 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/feb2009/db2009021_893728.htm.   
 16. Id.   
 17. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight, Presidential Politics and H-1B Visas (CNN television broadcast 
Mar. 10, 2008), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0803/10/ldt.01.html 
(mentioning reports that “show H-1B tech workers are typically paid less than an American worker 
doing the same job.”).   
 18. See Wasem, supra note 13, at 12; Norm Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-
immigrant Work Visa in Computer-related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 815, 816, 863 
(2003). 
 19. See, e.g., Tyrone Beason, On Temporary Visas, Skilled Workers are Putting Down Real Roots, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, at 16 (“Workers’ groups . . . argue American companies are using the 
program to shift jobs to foreign nationals who can be easily fired and replaced, and possibly paid less.”); 
Simone M. Schiller, Does the United States Need Additional High-Tech Work Visas or Not?  A Critical 
Look at the So-Called H-1B Visa Debate, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 645, 650 (2001) (“Many 
U.S. labor unions and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers allege that the high-tech 
industry prefers hiring foreign workers . . . as a means to suppress wages.”). 
 20. Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1161, 
1180 (2008). 
GRIFFITHARTICLE31-1.DOCX 10/13/2009  4:53 PM 
128 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL [Vol. 31:125 
competitive problem” for U.S. workers21 and may have reduced wage rates 
of some domestic workers.22  Others point out that, at the aggregate level, 
migrant workers do not negatively affect labor conditions for domestic 
workers.23  Much of this debate centers on “whether low-income [domestic] 
workers are hurt a lot or just a little.”24  While the direct causal relationship 
between the presence of migrants and declining labor standards in the U.S. 
remains hotly contested, there is no doubt that many migrant workers, 
especially undocumented migrant workers, are concentrated in low-wage 
workplaces25 where workplace rights are poorly followed and poorly 
enforced.26 
This article provides an overview of U.S. law governing documented 
and undocumented migrant workers.  In doing so, it also illustrates the 
tensions and questions raised by the current interconnections between two 
largely separate statutory regimes—U.S. immigration law and U.S. labor & 
employment law.  These two regimes have “sometimes contradictory 
legislative impulses.”27  Generally speaking, U.S. immigration law is the set 
of rules governing the admission, employment, naturalization, and 
deportation of foreigners.  Immigration law, by definition, contains “an 
ascending scale of rights that privileges legal immigrants over 
undocumented ones.”28  United States labor law is often used as shorthand 
to refer to laws that protect certain forms of collective action and organizing 
among employees in the workplace.  Employment law, which also provides 
 
 21. Paul Weiler, Comparative Labor and Employment Law and Policy in the Next Quarter 
Century:  Enhancing Worker Lives through Fairer Labor and Worklife Law in Comparative 
Perspective, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 143, 147 (2003). 
 22. See, e.g., George J. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping:  Reexamining the 
Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market, 118 QUART. J. OF ECON. 1335 (2003) (indicating that 
immigrants reduce wages of non-immigrants); Bruce Stokes, The Lost Wages of Immigration, NAT’L J., 
Jan. 7, 2006 (citing studies that indicate that immigrants reduce wage rates). 
 23. See, e.g., David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?, 115 ECON. J. 300, 300–23 
(2005) (contending that there is “no strong evidence that immigration has overall effects on aggregate 
employment, participation, unemployment and wages”).  However, “the estimated effect of immigration 
on the wage of native workers varies widely from study to study and sometimes even within the same 
study.” Simonetta Longhi, Peter Nijkamp & Jacques Poot, A Meta-Analytic Assessment of the Effect of 
Immigration on Wages, 19 J. OF ECON. SURVEYS, 451, 472 (2005).  For a discussion of recent studies 
see Jonathan G. Goodrich, Looking for a Visa System that Promotes the U.S. Economy and National 
Security, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 975, 991 n.131 (2008); Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 20, at 1183. 
 24. Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, NY TIMES MAG., July 7, 2006, at 36. 
 25. Passel & Cohn, supra note 3, at ii–iii, 10–14. 
 26. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 57, 58 (2002) (“The lower the wages, the more likely that fundamental employment laws, 
including safety, health, and wage and hour laws, will be violated.  Low-wage employees are apt to lack 
the knowledge and the resources to enforce their rights, and there simply are too few government 
inspectors to ensure compliance with basic safety, health, and wage and hour laws in workplaces all over 
the country.”). 
 27. Catherine Fisk & Michael Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB:  
Labor Rights without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 400 (Laura 
J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005). 
 28. Id. at 399 (emphasis added). 
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some protection of collective action,29 is generally used to refer to 
protections for the workplace rights of employees as individuals.  The U.S. 
labor and employment law regime, unlike immigration law, views the equal 
and wide application of the rights of employees as necessary for “public 
deterrence.”30  In other words, an underlying rationale is that “the fate of all 
workers depends on the treatment of each.”31 
Section I describes U.S. immigration law as it applies to documented 
and undocumented migrant workers.  It outlines the legal regulation of 
several key temporary migrant worker visa categories and identifies U.S. 
immigration law restrictions on the employment of undocumented migrant 
workers.  It highlights the particular aspects of immigration regulation that 
may unintentionally create barriers to the effective enforcement of 
workplace protections for employees.  Sections II and III of the article 
examine the legal rights and remedies available to documented and 
undocumented migrant workers pursuant to federal labor and employment 
laws.  These sections will underscore how the current intersection of federal 
immigration law and labor and employment law, including the unresolved 
legal questions it has created, may undermine the viability of the workplace 
law regime more broadly.  For instance, it explores the ways that 
workplace-based immigration regulation strategies, which largely 
originated in the 1980s and have intensified recently, may affect 
employees’ workplace protections.  Section IV will provide a brief 
overview of advocacy efforts on behalf of documented and undocumented 
migrant workers.  Section V assesses the status of U.S. “Migrant worker 
law” and explores the interstices of federal labor and employment law and 
immigration law.   
I. U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND MIGRANT WORKERS 
In 1952, the U.S. Congress centralized immigration laws into one 
federal statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).32  Congress has 
amended the INA many times since 1952 but the statute continues to serve 
as the central node of U.S immigration law.33  The INA sets out temporary 
worker visa requirements that apply to documented migrant workers and, 
 
 29. See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 
(2008) (making a persuasive case that employment law has provided underappreciated protections for 
collective action among workers).   
 30. Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 27, at 399. 
 31. Id. at 400. 
 32. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.  For a comprehensive account of U.S. immigration law and the 
emergence of the concept of the “illegal alien,” see MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:  ILLEGAL 
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004). 
 33. See id.   
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through the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),34 sets 
out restrictions on the employment of undocumented migrant workers.  In 
the following sections, I describe the INA’s regulation of migrant workers 
and its potential effects on workplace protections for employees.   
A. The INA and Documented Migrant Workers 
The INA specifies under what circumstances foreign workers can 
come to the United States as temporary workers.35  Temporary workers, 
which the INA formally deems “nonimmigrants,” are permitted to come to 
the United States “for a temporary period and for a specific purpose.”36  As 
mentioned above, the United States issues approximately one million 
temporary work visas per year.  While there are a number of temporary 
worker visa categories, including one for individuals with “extraordinary 
ability,”37 another for exceptional entertainers and athletes,38 and a third for 
foreign nurses in “medically underserved areas,”39 this section discusses the 
larger, better-known, and perhaps most controversial categories of 
temporary migrant worker visas:40  (1) temporary workers in specialty 
occupations (H-1B visa holders)41 and (2) temporary agricultural and non-
agricultural workers (H-2A and H-2B visa holders).42   
Unlike some of its counterparts, the so-called “H” visa program 
requires an employer to satisfy what I will loosely refer to here as a “labor 
market test” before it hires H visa workers.43  The labor market tests, which 
are not very rigorous, are intended to ensure that the influx of foreign labor 
does not displace or adversely affect the wages and working conditions of 
domestic workers.44  A federal agency, the U.S. Department of Labor 
 
 34. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a, 1324b, 1324c. 
 35. For information on longer term work visas, see U.S. Dep’t of State, Employment Visas, 
available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1323.html. 
 36. Ruth Ellen Wasem & Chad C. Haddal, Congressional Research Serv., U.S. Immigration Policy 
on Temporary Admissions-RL31381, 2 (2007). 
 37. For information on O-1 visas, see U.S. Dep’t of State, Temporary Workers, available at 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1271.html (describing O-1 classification as applying “to 
persons who have extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics, or 
extraordinary achievements in the motion picture and television field”). 
 38. Id. (describing P-1 classification as applying to “individual or team athletes, or members of an 
entertainment group that are internationally recognized.”).   
 39. Id. (describing H-1C visa and stating that this visa category comes out of Nursing Relief for 
Disadvantaged Areas Act, which will expire on December 20, 2009). 
 40. For reference to H visas as the “major nonimmigrant category for temporary workers,” see 
Wasem, supra note 12, at 2.   
 41. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). 
 42. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).   
 43. Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Serv., Immigration of Foreign Workers:  Labor 
Market Tests and Protections 8 (2007) (stating that many temporary work visas “do not trigger the 
requirement [of a labor market test].”). 
 44. Id. at 1. 
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(DOL), is in charge of administering the labor market tests for the H-1 and 
H-2 programs through a certification process.   
1. Temporary Skilled Workers: H-1B Visa Program 
Congress originally created the H-1 temporary work visa for skilled 
foreign workers in 1952.45  In 1990, in the context of a “technological 
explosion,” the U.S. Congress altered the H-1 program and created the 
current H-1B temporary worker visa category46 to address U.S. business 
demands for a “brain gain” of skilled foreign workers.47  Congress was, in 
part, “responding to fears concerning the U.S. workforce’s ability to 
compete in the global economy.”48  These visas are mainly granted to those 
who are qualified, with a bachelor’s degree or equivalent, for a “specialty 
occupation”49 and to fashion models “of distinguished merit and ability.”50  
While a number of skilled foreign workers are eligible to obtain H-1B visas, 
the program focuses largely on information technology workers.51  There is 
a cap of 65,000 H-1B workers per year but the numbers of H-1B visas 
issued are often higher than the cap and vary year to year due to a number 
of statutory exceptions to the cap.52  
Several aspects of the H-1B temporary visa program differ from other 
temporary visa categories.  H-1B visas are generally issued for three years 
and can be extended for a total of six years.53  Although the INA considers 
 
 45. Joseph Tiger, Note, Re-bending the Paperclip:  An Examination of America’s Policy 
Regarding Skilled Workers and Student Visas, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 507, 511 n.45 (2008). 
 46. Brian John Halliday, In Order to Hire the Best Person for the Job,  We Have to Do What?, 11 
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 37 (1999).   
 47. Alejandro Portes, Migration, Development, and Segmented Assimilation:  A Conceptual 
Review of the Evidence, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 73, 81-87 (2007) (describing the 
“brain gain” and “brain drain” aspects of migration of professional workers); Jung S. Hahm, Note, 
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998:  Balancing Economic and Labor 
Interests Under the New H-1B Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1673, 1682 (2000) (“In formulating 
the H-1B visa program, Congress recognized the increasing reliance of U.S. businesses on highly skilled 
foreign professionals.”). 
 48. Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent:  Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration 
Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 181 (2006) (quoting DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 34 (3d ed. 1992)). 
 49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); 8 C.F.R § 214.2(h)(4).   
 50. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).  H-1B visas also apply to certain 
individuals performing services for a “cooperative research and development project or a coproduction 
project” related to the Secretary of Defense.  See id. 
 51. See, e.g., Bradly J. Condon & J. Brad McBride, Do You Know the Way to San Jose?  Resolving 
the Problem of Illegal Mexican Migration to the United States, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 251, 280–81 
(2003). 
 52. Wassem, supra note 43, at 8 (“[M]ost H-1B workers enter on visas that are exempt from the 
ceiling.”).  See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g). 
 53. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4) (referring to the six year limit); Shachar, supra note 48, at 182 (“[T]he 
H-1B is a temporary three-year employment visa that can, and often is, extended for up to six years.”).  
See also Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, H-1B Nonimmigrant Workers, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW 127 
(2007) (PLI N.Y. Practice Skills Course Handbook Series No. F-167, 2007) [hereinafter referred to as 
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the visas “temporary,” many H-1B holders have the option to obtain 
permanent residency and eventually citizenship in the United States.54  A 
U.S. employer, however, must sponsor the H-1B’s application for 
permanent residence.  Beneficiaries of temporary work visas in other 
categories, such as the H-2 category, do not have a similar option.  
Moreover, while a specific employer must petition for an H-1B visa 
initially, H-1B workers may be able to change employers while they are 
working in the United States.55  The American Competitiveness in the 
Twenty First Century Act, which Congress passed in 2000, made it easier 
for H-1B visa holders to change employers (“visa portability”) if a new 
employer files a legitimate petition for employment and the visa holder 
complies with other requirements.56  However, the process is not seamless.  
H-1B workers still “may have difficulties changing jobs if their first job 
does not work out.”57   
The other unique feature of the H-1B program is the labor market test.  
Unlike the H-2 program, an H-1B employer does not have to actively 
recruit domestic workers.  The labor market test for H-1B visas, which 
requires a short application, is less rigorous than the H-2 labor market test 
for temporary seasonal agricultural and non-agricultural workers.58  For H-
1B visas, the Labor Certification Application (LCA) to the U.S. Department 
of Labor (DOL) requires an employer attestation, which is “a statement of 
intent rather than a documentation of actions taken.”59  Specifically, as part 
of the attestation to the DOL, the employer attests (1) that the H-1B worker 
will be paid the higher of the prevailing wage and the actual wages paid to 
 
“Basic Immigration Law”] (“The American Competitiveness in the Twenty First Century Act (AC21), 
however, provides for the extension of the H-1B employee’s status beyond six years in cases where the 
foreign national’s immigrant visa petition or adjustment of status application is pending. . .”). 
 54. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), H-1B Foreign Workers:  Better Controls Needed to 
Help Employers and Protect Workers, GAO/HEHS-00-157, at 6 (2000) (“Unlike most temporary 
worker visa categories, H-1B workers can intend both to work temporarily and to immigrate 
permanently at some future time.”). 
 55. Yale-Loehr, supra note 53, at 127–28. 
 56. See id.; American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000—Immigration and 
Infrastructure, Pub. L. No. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (2000); Yan Chen, Comment, An Examination on 
Regulating the Employment of Foreign Skilled Workers in the United States, 6 U. PA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
179, 183 (2003) (stating that the change in 2000 “improved the portability of H-1B visas so that a worker 
may begin new employment immediately upon the filing of a change-of-job petition by a new employer 
and need not wait months for the actual approval by the INS.”). 
 57. Alan Hyde, Employee Organization in Silicon Valley:  Networks, Ethnic Organization, and 
New Unions, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 493, 521 (2002) (“H-1B visa holders’ most frequent requests 
are that they would like a smoother transition to permanent resident status and increased mobility among 
jobs that are not with their original visa sponsor.”).  See also Alien Who Changed Jobs Before New Boss 
Filed Visa Petition Is Deportable, Court Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) (Sept. 15, 2008), at A-1 (“An H-
1B visa holder may be deported because he began a new job before his new employer filed a visa 
petition for him”). 
 58. See Wassem, supra note 43, at 10–11, 14. 
 59. Id. at 11. 
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employees who work in the same occupation; (2) that the working 
conditions of the H-1B worker will not adversely affect the working 
conditions of domestic workers; and, (3) that currently there are no lockouts 
or strikes at the workplace.60  The H-1 program’s wages requirement is the 
main protection against the adverse effect on domestic workers.  To 
determine the prevailing wage, an employer can use “a wide variety of 
sources of wage data,” including data from state agencies or surveys from 
private firms.61  Many have argued that “there is wide variation from one 
survey to another, thus allowing the employer to select the lowest of many 
widely varying figures.”62 
The DOL certifies the vast majority of LCA applications.63  Once the 
DOL certifies the LCA application, the employer submits a petition to the 
U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) that contains (1) the 
certified LCA; (2) attestation that the employer will comply with the LCA; 
and, (3) documentation related to the applicant’s qualifications.64  As 
mentioned above, the U.S. employer does not have to show that it engaged 
in active recruitment of domestic workers or that there were no qualified 
domestic applicants.  The USCIS then reviews the application and decides 
whether to grant the employer’s application for an H-1B visa.  There are 
additional LCA requirements for H-1B employers that have a workforce 
comprised of 15% or more H-1B workers (H-1B dependent employers) or 
who have violated LCA requirements willfully.65  Among other things, 
before filing an LCA, H-1B-dependent employers must first try to recruit 
domestic workers and must offer the job to qualified domestic workers who 
are willing and able to take the job.66  
Finally, one should note that although H-1B workers have a number of 
workplace rights, there are often significant barriers to their enforcement.67  
 
 60. Id. See also id. (“The firm must provide a copy of the LCA to representatives of the bargaining 
unit or—if there is no bargaining representative—must post the LCA in conspicuous locations at the 
work site.”).  
 61. Matloff, supra note 18, at 902. 
 62. See, e.g., id. 
 63. Yale-Loehr, supra note 53, at 135; Philip Martin, Guest Workers:  New Solution or New 
Problem?, 2007 U CHI LEGAL F 289, 311 (2007) (“[M]ost employers simply ‘attest’ that they are paying 
at least the prevailing wage to a college-educated foreigner who is to fill a job normally requiring a 
college education; there are typically no investigations of employer assertions unless the government 
receives complaints.”); Wasem, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that the DOL “reviews the application for 
completeness and obvious inaccuracies” and that the DOL investigates “[o]nly if a complaint 
subsequently is raised.”).   
 64. Yale-Loehr, supra note 53, at 131–37. 
 65. U.S. Wage and Hour Div., “Fact Sheet #62O:  Must an H-1B employer recruit U.S. workers 
before seeking H-1B workers?” (July 2008), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/regs/compliance/FactSheet62/whdfs62O.pdf. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See, e.g., Sabrina Underwood, Note, Achieving the American Daydream:  The Social, 
Economic, and Political Inequalities Experienced by Temporary Workers Under the H-1B Visa 
Program, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 727, 736 (2001); Matloff, supra note 18, at 913 (“The H-1B program 
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H-1B visa holders can sometimes enforce terms of their LCAs, such as their 
wage rate, by filing a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor.68  
Moreover, as will be discussed below, many H-1B workers also have state 
and federal labor and employment law rights to engage in collective action 
and to work free of certain forms of discrimination.  However, the difficulty 
H-1B workers have in changing employers during the visa term creates a 
disincentive against making a workplace law complaint.  Moreover, H-1B 
workers may be particularly “vulnerable to exploitation” because, as 
mentioned above, they often rely on their employer for their permanent 
residency applications and have to wait long periods of time before those 
applications are processed.69  There is little doubt that “[v]isa holders, by 
the very nature of their situation as workers dependent upon employers for 
the right to remain in the country—either permanently or temporarily—
remain less likely to protest against unfair working conditions than their 
counterparts with permanent resident status.”70   
As I will discuss below, the INA’s regulation of the H-2 temporary 
work visa program also poses challenges to the effective enforcement of 
employee workplace protections. 
2. Temporary Agricultural and Non-agricultural Workers: 
H-2 Visa Program 
Congress designed the H-2 program to supply temporary workers to 
the U.S. labor market in 1952.71  Unlike H-1B visa applicants, the H-2 
program does not require particular skills or achievement.  In 1986 
Congress split the H-2 temporary visa program into two separate categories: 
H-2A visas for temporary agricultural workers72 and H-2B visas for 
temporary non-agricultural workers who work in seasonal industries.73  H-
 
has a long history of abuse by IT employers of all types and sizes.  The abuse is largely, but not 
exclusively, due to the de facto indentured servitude of the H-1Bs.”); Wasem, supra note 13, at 13 
(“GAO has issued reports that recommended more controls to protect workers, to prevent abuses . . .”). 
 68. See Yale-Loehr, supra note 53, at 14 (listing relevant regulations).  See also id. (“A cause of 
complaints that has resulted in costly penalties to employers, in the form of back wages and sanctions, is 
the benching or termination of an H-1B employee prior to the end of the LCA Term . . .”).   
 69. Wasem, supra note 43, at 16 (referring to perspective of “[a]dvocates for temporary foreign 
workers”); id. at 17 (“Some allege that employers prefer foreign workers because they are less 
demanding in terms of wages and working conditions.”).   
 70. Goodsell, supra note 14, at 172. 
 71. Bryce W. Ashby, Note, Indentured Guests—How the H-2A and H-2B Temporary Guest 
Worker Programs Create the Conditions for Indentured Servitude and Why Upfront Reimbursement for 
Guest Workers’ Transportation, Visa, and Recruitment Costs is the Solution, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 893, 
899 (2008).   
 72. H-2A workers perform “agricultural labor or services of a temporary or seasonal nature.” 8 
C.F.R. 214.2(h). 
 73. Id. (describing H-2B workers as persons “coming to perform other temporary services or 
labor”). 
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2A agricultural workers typically work cultivating or harvesting fruits and 
vegetables.  H-2B workers typically work in seasonal industries such as 
“traveling carnivals,”74 forestry, hotels, seafood processing, cruise liners, 
landscaping, construction, and ski resorts.75  H-2B visas have also been 
issued to workers in conjunction with national disaster recovery efforts.  In 
the wake of the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, H-2B visa 
holders helped to rebuild the effected Gulf Coast regions.76  The numbers 
vary from year to year but the U.S. grants approximately 100,000 H-2A 
visas77 and 66,000 H-2B visas each year.78   
H-2 visa holders are at a disadvantage compared to H-1B visa holders.  
Unlike H-1B visas that are initially granted for three years and can be 
extended for an additional three years, H-2 visas are generally granted for a 
year or less.  While H-2 visas can be extended for a total of three 
consecutive years “the Department of Labor grants extensions sparingly.”79 
Also unlike H-1B visa holders, H-2 visa holders do not have any 
opportunity to seek permanent residency or citizenship in the United States 
and do not have any opportunity to switch employers during their visa 
terms.   
Another important difference between the H-2 and H-1 programs is the 
H-2 labor market tests.80  The labor market tests for H-2A and H-2B 
workers are more extensive than the H-1 test.  Most significantly, before an 
employer may hire an H-2 worker, a U.S. employer first needs to actively 
try to find a U.S. employee to perform the job through an affirmative 
recruitment process.81  If the employer can fill the vacant position with a 
domestic employee, it cannot take advantage of the H-2 program.82  In the 
application, the employer attests both that “unemployed domestic workers 
are not available and that there will not be an adverse effect on U.S. 
 
 74. Arthur N. Read, Learning from the Past:  Designing Effective Worker Protections for 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 423, 433 n.44 (2007). 
 75. Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 5, at 1; Elmore, supra note 1, at 524.   
 76. See, e.g., Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, L.L.C., 488 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566–567 (E.D. 
La. 2007) (“Plaintiffs are guestworkers recruited from foreign countries following Hurricane Katrina to 
work in the Defendants’ luxury hotels in the New Orleans area.”). 
 77. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics:  Temporary 
Admissions of Nonimmigrants to the United States, tbl. 3 (2009) (illustrating year-to-year variation).  
There is no cap on H-2A visas.  See Wasem, supra note 43, at 8. 
 78. For 66,000 cap on H-2B visas, see 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).  For exceptions to the H-2B cap see 
Egalitarianism and Exclusion at 569 n.181 (“Under current law, workers having completed an H-2B 
work visa may return as ‘H-2R’ workers” without affecting the cap). 
 79. Elmore, supra note 1, at 554 n.180.   
 80. For an overview of the differences between labor market tests, see Wasem, supra note 43, at 
14, tbl. 1.  The H-2A and H-2B requirements have fluctuated since 2008.  This section aims to provide 
readers with the general contours of the requirements while acknowledging that the regulations may 
change in the near future. 
 81. Andorra Bruno, Congressional Research Serv., Immigration:  Policy Considerations Related to 
Guest Worker Programs-RL32044 2-3 (2006). 
 82. Id. at 2. 
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workers from the alien workers’ entry into the labor market.”83  An H-2A 
employer is required to pay the highest of the minimum wage, prevailing 
hourly wage, and the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR).84  The 
calculation of the AEWR is in flux as President Obama’s administration 
tries to roll back Bush administration changes in this area.85  Similar to the 
H-1B program but unlike the H-2A program, an H-2B employer must 
promise to pay the prevailing wage for the occupation.86 
Both worker advocates and employers criticize the H-2 labor market 
tests.  Some claim that the labor certification process is “ineffective” in its 
attempts to protect domestic workers.87  Among other things, critics note 
that there is unfair competition because the wages offered to temporary 
migrant workers are not on par with wages for domestic workers.88  
Employers, especially small businesses, describe the labor certification 
process in general as so “overly cumbersome” that they cannot quickly 
respond and “meet their labor needs.”89  In fact, some employers admit that 
they opt out of the H-2 program entirely and hire undocumented workers 
because the “process is too expensive, taxing, and time-consuming.”90  
Some have advocated for a labor market test, similar to the H-1B test.91 
 
 83. Wasem, supra note 43, at 1–2.  For recent regulatory changes to the H-2A and H-2B programs, 
currently being challenged in court, see 
http://www.dol.gov/federalregister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=21861 and 
http://www.dol.gov/federalregister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=21887.  See also Steven Greenhouse, Labor 
Secretary Proposes Suspending Farm Rules, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 2009, at A11. 
 84. 20 C.F.R.  Department of Labor, Wages and Foreign Labor Certification, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/compliance/topics/wages-foreign-workers.htm. 
 85. 20 C.F.R.  Sam Hananel, US Seeks Tighter Rules on Foreign Workers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Sept. 3, 2009 (“The Labor Department briefly suspended the Bush rules earlier this year, but officials 
were forced to reinstate them after farm groups successfully challenged the decision in federal court.”). 
 86. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Foreign Labor Certification Prevailing Wages, available at 
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/wages.cfm. 
 87. Bruno, supra note 81, at 30 (citing U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, 
Consolidation of Labor’s Enforcement Responsibilities for the H-2A Program Could Better Protect U.S. 
Agricultural Workers, Report Number 04-98-004-030321, Mar. 31, 1998).  See also Martin, supra note 
62, at 295 (“Government employment services are ill-suited to second-guess employers who find local 
workers unqualified”).   
 88. See Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1457 (2008) 
(“Labor advocates object that the prevailing wage approved by the U.S. Department of Labor frequently 
bears little relation to actual wages in that sector and region, and is rarely enforced in any event.”).  See 
also Denice Velez, Wages for H-2B workers set lower than the prevailing wage (Snapshot for Aug. 13, 
2008), available at http://www.epi.org/economic_snapshots/entry/webfeatures_snapshots_20080813/ 
(“[E]xamination of seven of the occupations most commonly filled by H-2B workers . . . shows that in 
almost every case, H-2B certified wages were lower than the prevailing wage reported by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  In 64% of cases, the DOL-certified wage fell below 75% of the mean hourly wage.”). 
 89. Bruno, supra note 81, at 3. 
 90. Merav Lichtenstein, Note, An Examination of Guest Worker Immigration Reform Policies in 
the United States, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 689, 697 (2007).  See also Patricia Medige, 
Perspectives on the Bush Administration’s New Immigrant Guestworker Proposal:  Immigrant Labor 
Issues, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 735, 738 (2004). 
 91. Wasem, supra note 43, at 16.   
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Although H-2 workers have a number of workplace protections, 
worker advocates criticize them as insufficient.92  For example, even when 
the labor law of the worker’s country of origin requires foreign employers 
to pay inbound travel costs, neither the H-2A nor the H-2B program 
requires the employer to pay these costs up front.93  Furthermore, because 
the employers often pay these fees and then deduct them from an H-2 
worker’s wages, many workers start off their employment “in substantial 
debt” to their employers.94  The H-2B program, which often brings in more 
workers than the H-2A program, has fewer legal protections for migrant 
workers than the H-2A program.95  For instance, the H-2A program requires 
a pay rate that is “typically higher” than the prevailing wage rate for H-2B 
workers.96  The H2-A program also goes further than its H-2B counterpart 
in that it requires the employer to provide employment for at least 3/4 of the 
amount of time promised in the visa application and to provide certain 
housing and transportation benefits.97  
There are formidable barriers to the enforcement of H-2 workplace 
rights.  H-2 workers are often at the bottom of the wage scale and cannot 
afford an attorney.  A limited number of non-profit legal services offices 
can represent H-2A workers.  But those that receive federal funding from 
the Legal Services Corporation are prohibited from representing H-2B 
workers, except those who work in forestry.98  The lack of visa portability, 
which intensifies the inequality of bargaining power between the employer 
and the low-skill migrant worker, is another important barrier for H-2 
workers.  H-2 workers often “fear being blacklisted—refused employment 
 
 92. See, e.g., Medige, supra note 90, at 739 (“[W]orkers and worker advocates have longstanding 
concerns about both the H-2A and H-2B temporary worker programs.”). 
 93. If an H-2A worker completes 50% of the contract period the employer must pay the inbound 
transportation costs.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(5). 
 94. Elmore, supra note 1, at 536; Kati L. Griffith, Globalizing U.S. Employment Law Through 
Foreign Law Influence:  Mexico’s Foreign Employer Provision and Recruited Mexican Workers, 29 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 383, 387–90 (2008) (discussing worker debt and the legal obligations of 
employers with respect to a worker’s transportation costs).  See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra 
note 5, at 9 (“The workers, most of whom live in poverty, frequently must obtain high-interest loans to 
come up with the money to pay the fees.  In addition, recruiters sometimes require them to leave 
collateral, such as the deed to their house or car, to ensure that they fulfill the terms of their individual 
labor contract.”). 
 95. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 655.102, § 655.103. 
 96. Medige, supra note 90, at 739.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(9) (describing H-2A rates of pay as 
the highest “the adverse effect wage rate in effect at the time the work is performed, the prevailing 
hourly wage rate, or the legal federal or State minimum wage rate.”). 
 97. For a full list of differences between the programs, see Wasem, supra note 43, at 12–14. 
 98. Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 891, 921-
923 (2008) (hereinafter referred to as “Internationalization of Public Interest Law”); 45 C.F.R. 1626.11. 
For a description of the change in regulations that permitted Legal Services Corporation-funded 
organizations to represent H-2B forestry workers see Legal Services Corporation, “Temporary Forestry 
Workers Now Eligible for LSC-Funded Legal Services,” available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/press/updates_2008_detail_T220_R0.php.   
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in future years—or otherwise intimidated if they attempt to assert their 
rights.”99  H-2 workers are vulnerable if they dare to make a complaint 
because their current legal status in the United Staes and future participation 
in the program depends on their employer.100  Moreover, the payment of 
up-front recruitment fees often makes workers “reluctant to complain and 
risk losing their jobs.”101  An H-2B worker who came to the United States 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for instance, alleges that he paid 
$20,000 to a labor recruiter before coming to the United States from 
India.102  The fears and debts of H-2 workers exacerbate the already 
existing inadequacies of workplace law enforcement.103 
B. The INA and Undocumented Migrant Workers 
Similar to the INA’s regulation of the temporary visa program, the 
INA’s regulation of undocumented migrant workers poses challenges for 
the workplace law regime.  The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA) amended the INA and marked a fundamental shift in U.S. 
immigration law away from its primary emphasis on the “the terms and 
conditions of admission .  .  .  and the subsequent treatment of aliens 
lawfully in the country”104 toward a focus on the workplace.105  As the 
 
 99. Medige, supra note 90, at 739. 
 100. See, e.g., Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 5, at 6 (stating that a worker’s “ability to 
return during any subsequent season depends entirely on an employer’s willingness to submit a request 
to the U.S. government.  In practical terms, it means that an employee is much less likely to complain 
about workplace safety or wage issues.”). 
 101. Nicole Gaouette, Guest workers in U.S. say they are being exploited:  They want Congress to 
reassess the program, which they contend abuses foreign laborers and hurts U.S. workers, L.A. TIMES, 
June 12, 2008, at A11. 
 102. Id.  See David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68787, **4-5 (E.D. La. 2008). 
 103. See U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Fair Labor Standards Act:  Better Use of 
Resources and Consistent Reporting Could Improve Compliance, GAO/HEHS-08-962T, at 2-22 (2008); 
Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 5, at 7, 28 (citing Brennan Center for Justice, Trends in Wage 
and Hour Enforcement by the U.S. Department of Labor, 1975-2004 (Economic Policy Brief, No. 3, 
September 2005)).  The DOL is charged with investigating worker complaints and enforcing the H-2A 
regulations, including the H-2A and H-2B contract.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(g).  In recent regulatory 
changes, the DOL now is charged to enforce provisions of the H-2B work contract.  See U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS Finalizes Streamlining Procedures for H-2B Temporary 
Non-Agricultural Worker Program, available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=332
cef590da4e110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=3381c0ed71f85110VgnVCM100000
4718190aRCRD.   
 104. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1976) (describing immigration law before IRCA). 
 105. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Employment is the 
magnet that attracts aliens here illegally . . . Employers will be deterred by the penalties in this 
legislation from hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter aliens from entering illegally or 
violating their status in search of employment.”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(1), at 46 (1986), as 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650). 
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Supreme Court has stated, “IRCA forcefully made combating the 
employment of illegal aliens central to the policy of immigration law.106   
Specifically, IRCA requires employers to check employees’ eligibility 
for employment and contains civil and criminal sanctions for employers 
who knowingly hire undocumented workers (“employer sanctions”).107  
Every U.S. employer is required to fill out immigration paperwork for its 
employees.  The immigration paperwork, currently the I-9 Employment 
Eligibility Verification form, requires a prospective employee to provide 
documentation confirming his or her eligibility for employment and 
requires the employer to inspect the documentation for its validity.108  The 
U.S. employer must also be careful when reviewing an employee’s 
documents not to discriminate based on national origin.109  The I-9 form, 
and not the employer, specifies which types of documents are satisfactory.  
While the employer must keep the I-9 on file for a specified period of time, 
the U.S. employer is not required to submit the I-9 or any documentation to 
the U.S. government unless requested to do so.110  Generally speaking, 
therefore, if a document appears on its face to be valid, the U.S. employer 
does not know that the person is undocumented and can hire the prospective 
employee without violating IRCA.111  The government can sanction 
employers when it can establish that an employer knowingly employed an 
undocumented employee.112 
 
 106. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002). 
 107. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 
 108. For a copy of the form see Dep’t of Homeland Security, USCIS, “Form I-9, Employment 
Verification,” available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/I-9.pdf. 
 109. For instance, employers cannot request additional documentation from prospective employees 
just because they were born abroad or speak with a foreign accent.  8 U.S.C. § 1324b.  With IRCA’s 
antidiscrimination provision, Congress intended “[t]o address the fear that employers would overreact to 
the threat of sanctions and discriminate against individuals who sounded or appeared ‘foreign.’”  U.S. 
Dep’t of Agriculture, Office of the Chief Economist, “Labor Laws,” available at 
http://www.usda.gov/oce/labor/ina.htm. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Document verification is very subjective.  See Lisa W. Foderaro, Plenty of Apples, But a 
Possible Shortage Of Immigrant Pickers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at B1 (reporting on the following 
employer statement:  “It’s hard to tell who’s legal and who’s not.  They all have documents.”).  IRCA’s 
employer sanctions provisions are largely viewed as ineffectual from the point of view of immigration 
enforcement goals.  See generally, Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized 
Immigrants:  The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 205-08 (2007).  Nonetheless, due to 
recent high-profile immigration workplace raids and state laws sanctioning employers who hire 
undocumented workers, it appears that more employers have begun to take notice of both federal and 
state employer sanctions laws.  See, e.g., Julia Preston, Employers Fight Tough Measures On 
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008, at A1. 
 112. Some have argued that IRCA’s employee verification requirements led to “two predictable 
consequences”:  (1) the expansion of a black market in fraudulent documents and (2) some employers 
passed off the new costs to workers by lowering wages and turning to subcontractors to avoid the new 
regulation altogether.  DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS:  MEXICAN 
IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 119–22 (2002). 
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While IRCA’s workplace-based immigration enforcement scheme, 
viewed comprehensively, largely focuses on employer restrictions, it also 
specifically targets the actions of undocumented employees to some 
extent.113  In 1990, Congress amended IRCA, making it illegal for an 
employee to knowingly provide his or her employer or prospective 
employer with fraudulent documents.114  IRCA did not explicitly make it 
illegal for an undocumented employee to simply seek or accept 
employment in the United States.115  In other words, a purely “off the 
books” employee does not violate IRCA.   
For a number of reasons, IRCA’s workplace-based immigration 
enforcement scheme creates barriers for the effective enforcement of 
workplace protections.  Because IRCA gives employers a prominent role in 
immigration enforcement,116 workers are likely to be fearful of speaking out 
about workplace law violations.  Some have argued that IRCA’s employer 
sanctions “contributed to expansion of an ‘underground economy’ in which 
employers seek out and hire undocumented workers, expecting them to 
work for lower wages and working conditions and to remain silent about 
violations of workplace rights out of fear of losing their job or being 
reported to immigration authorities.”117  Also, IRCA enforcement through 
workplace immigration raids further pushes undocumented workers into the 
shadows.118  It is unclear what role workplace immigration raids will play 
during the Obama administration.  President Obama, who took office in 
January, 2009, “has promised immigration enforcement that would focus 
less on illegal workers and more on the employers who rely on them.”119  
During the final years of the Bush administration, workplace immigration 
raids, such as the meatpacking raid described in the introduction, were a key 
 
 113. See Kati L. Griffith, Comment, A Supreme Stretch:  The Supremacy Clause in the Wake of 
IRCA and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J 127, 128–29 (2008). 
 114. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c. 
 115. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Congress made 
IRCA’s new sanctions applicable only to aliens who knowingly or recklessly used false documents to 
obtain employment . . . It did not otherwise prohibit undocumented aliens from seeking or maintaining 
employment.”).   
 116. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 111, at 202 (describing IRCA as “regulatory policy that 
deputized the private sector to enforce public immigration laws.”). 
 117. Rebecca Smith & Catherine Ruckelhaus, Solutions, Not Scapegoats:  Abating Sweatshop 
Conditions for All Low-Wage Workers as a Centerpiece of Immigration Reform, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & 
PUB. POL’Y 555, 571 (2007). 
 118. See, e.g., Leticia Saucedo, A New ‘U’:  Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 
42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 893, 896–98 (2008). 
 119. Secretary Seeks Review of Immigration Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at A19.  Soon after 
President Obama’s inauguration, immigration authorities engaged in a workplace immigration raid and 
arrested twenty-eight workers suspected to lack immigration authorization.  The Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, did not know about the raid in advance and has 
ordered a comprehensive review.  Id. 
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aspect of immigration enforcement.120  While the Obama administration 
appears less interested in workplace immigration raids and criminal 
prosecutions against undocumented workers than his predecessor, highly 
publicized workplace-raids have undoubtedly intensified fears among 
undocumented workers.121 
As I will elaborate in the next section, IRCA’s workplace-based 
immigration enforcement scheme also threatens the workplace protections 
of employees because of its potential effects on federal labor and 
employment laws.  Congress intended, with IRCA, to decrease the magnetic 
pull of employment opportunities.  Therefore, questions emerged after 1986 
about IRCA’s effect on undocumented workers’ labor and employment law 
protections.  IRCA does not explicitly state what effect, if any, it has on the 
application of labor and employment laws to undocumented workers.  
Nonetheless IRCA, and its workplace-based immigration enforcement 
scheme, has undoubtedly had an impact on the labor and employment law 
regime.  In fact, some commentators have noted that IRCA has been 
“catastrophic for the labor rights of immigrant and U.S. workers.”122  As 
will be discussed below, while it is widely accepted that undocumented 
workers share the same labor and employment law rights as their 
documented counterparts, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of IRCA has 
created ambiguity about which labor and employment law remedies are 
available to undocumented workers.  Post-IRCA ambiguity about the 
relationship between federal immigration law and labor and employment 
law has made it even more unlikely that workplace law violations against 
undocumented workers will be addressed. 
II. U.S. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND MIGRANT WORKERS 
United States’ labor and employment statutes provide workplace-based 
rights for employees.  These laws, unlike immigration law and most 
federally funded public assistance programs,123 apply equally to 
documented and undocumented migrant workers.  After IRCA, however, 
workers who are known by their employers to be undocumented are not 
entitled to reinstatement as a remedy for an illegal termination.  Many U.S. 
 
 120. For a report on another immigration raid in 2008, see Adam Nossiter, Nearly 600 Were 
Arrested In Factory Raid, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008, at A16.   
 121. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Editorial, Workers Without Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at 
A27 (“Raids terrorize immigrants but do not make them go home.”). 
 122. Wishnie, supra note 88, at 1459. 
 123. Documented and undocumented temporary migrant workers are “not eligible for federally 
funded public assistance, with the exception of Medicaid emergency services.”  Bruno, supra note 81, at 
3 n.11.  See also Andorra Bruno, Congressional Research Serv., Immigration:  Policy Considerations 
Related to Guest Worker Programs-RL32044 3 n.10 (2008).   
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labor and employment laws require an employer—who illegally fires an 
employee for engaging in protected activity—to reinstate the illegally fired 
employee.  Under IRCA, however, an employer cannot knowingly hire an 
undocumented worker and therefore cannot reinstate a known 
undocumented worker without violating IRCA.  Moreover, as will be 
discussed below, the Supreme Court in its 2002 Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds v.  NLRB124 decision foreclosed an undocumented worker’s 
access to at least one labor law remedy in some circumstances and created 
confusion about IRCA’s effect on other labor and employment law 
remedies.   
A. Labor Law and Migrant Workers: The NLRA 
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA)125 regulates labor 
organizations and provides certain collective action and union organizing 
rights to employees in the private sector regardless of immigration status.  
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sure-Tan, Inc.  v.  NLRB explicitly held 
that the NLRA protects “employees” even when they do not have proper 
immigration authorization.126  NLRA Section 7, which is the heart of the 
NLRA’s worker protections, states that employees “shall have the right to 
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection.”127  It also states that employees have the right to 
“refrain from” these activities and provides certain limitations on union 
picketing and boycotting activities.128 
Nonetheless, not all migrant workers benefit from NLRA protection.  
The NLRA explicitly exempts, for instance, domestic workers and 
independent contractors from its coverage.129  Domestic workers are 
employed in “the domestic service of any family or person at his home.”130 
Therefore migrant domestic workers do not have a federal right to organize 
a union.  Because the test for determining who is an independent contractor 
 
 124. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 125. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. 
 126. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984) (“Since undocumented aliens are not 
among the few groups of workers expressly exempted by Congress, they plainly come within the broad 
statutory definition of ‘employee.’”). 
 127. 29 U.S.C. § 157.  The NLRA may protect employees from adverse employment actions that 
flow from missing work to attend immigration rallies and protests in some circumstances.  See generally 
Michael C. Duff, Days Without Immigrants:  Analysis and Implications of the Treatment of Immigration 
Rallies Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 93 (2007). 
 128. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 129. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
 130. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
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is multi-factored and unwieldy it is sometimes difficult to decipher who is 
an independent contractor and therefore exempt from the NLRA’s 
protections.131  Some migrant workers, for instance many day laborers, are 
engaged in work that some contend is misclassified as independent 
contractor work.132  Moreover, another important NLRA-exempt migrant 
worker group is agricultural workers, including H-2A visa holders.133   
These exceptions notwithstanding, many non-agricultural employees, 
including many H-1B and H-2B visa holders and undocumented workers, 
have a legal right to engage in collective action at the workplace.134  If an 
employee, labor organization, or employer wants to bring an NLRA action 
he or she must bring it to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), an 
administrative agency that enforces the NLRA.  The NLRA, unlike the 
federal employment laws I will discuss below, does not provide workers 
with a private right of action to bring a claim in court.  When it finds an 
NLRA violation the NLRB has “discretion to select and fashion remedies 
for violations of the NLRA.”135  One of the NLRA’s remedies, back pay, is 
no longer available to many NLRA-covered undocumented workers who 
experience an NLRA violation.136  The NLRA’s back pay remedy provides 
employees who experience unlawful terminations for engaging in NLRA-
protected activity with the payment of wages they would have received had 
they not experienced the unlawful terminations.  It also requires terminated 
employees to attempt to mitigate damages through a search for equivalent 
employment during the interim period when they are waiting for the NLRB 
to adjudicate their case.   
The Supreme Court’s 2002 Hoffman decision, however, reduced 
undocumented workers’ incentives to take advantage of these rights.  It 
determined that an undocumented employee, who had violated IRCA by 
using fraudulent documents and had experienced an NLRA violation, did 
not have access to the NLRA’s back pay remedy.137  The employer had 
illegally fired this undocumented employee for engaging in NLRA-
protected union organizing activity.  The Supreme Court concluded that 
 
 131. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).  For criticism of the independent contractor category see Marc Linder, 
Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law:  An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted 
in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 187 (1999). 
 132. See, e.g., Robert Knox, Braintree ruckus points up larger issue:  Union protests labor practice, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 2006, at 4. 
 133. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
 134. See generally U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Collective Bargaining Rights:  Information on the 
Number of Workers with and Without Bargaining Rights, 20 (2002). 
 135. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 142 (2002). 
 136. In Hoffman the Court concluded that the worker violated IRCA and the employer did not 
violate IRCA.  There is still an open question, therefore, about whether back pay is foreclosed (1) when 
an undocumented worker did not violate IRCA and/or (2) when an employer violated IRCA by 
knowingly hiring/employing the undocumented worker. 
 137. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
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allowing the NLRB to provide the undocumented worker with the NLRA’s 
back pay remedy would contravene IRCA’s policy goals.  It stated that 
awarding the back pay remedy “would encourage the successful evasion of 
apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the 
immigration laws, and encourage future violations.”138  The Court also 
determined that the removal of the NLRA’s back pay remedy would not 
serve as a detriment to the NLRA’s policy goals to protect collective action 
in the workplace because there were other remedies available to address the 
NLRA violation.139  Many, however, believe that effective enforcement of 
the NLRA requires the award of back pay remedy.  Soon after the Hoffman 
decision, for instance, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
estimated that the decision negatively affected approximately 5.5 million 
undocumented workers and stated that “because back pay is one of the 
major remedies available for a violation, this decision diminished the legal 
bargaining rights available to these workers under the act [NLRA].”140  
Since its Hoffman decision in 2002, the Supreme Court has not 
commented on IRCA’s applicability to other labor and employment law 
remedies.  This has left lower courts and commentators as well as 
employers and workers wondering how expansively to read the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of IRCA’s effect on the legal remedies available to 
undocumented workers in the employment law context.  Post-Hoffman legal 
questions demonstrate confusion about Congress’ view of the proper 
interaction between immigration law and labor and employment law.  To 
what extent did Congress intend, with its workplace-based immigration 
enforcement scheme (IRCA), to affect the remedies available to 
undocumented employees who suffer labor and employment law 
violations?  For instance, did Congress, with IRCA, intend to limit the 
remedies available to undocumented migrant workers who experience 
employment law violations?  If so, did Congress intend to do so only when 
the undocumented employee violates IRCA by using fraudulent documents 
to obtain employment or, similarly, only when the employer did not violate 
IRCA?  The next section will describe the employment law rights of 
documented and undocumented migrants as well as Hoffman’s potential 
effect on the remedies available for violations of those rights. 
B. Employment Law and Migrant Workers 
United States’ employment law statutes provide protections for 
documented and undocumented migrants.  While there are local and state 
 
 138. Id. at 151. 
 139. Id. at 152. 
 140. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 134, at 18. 
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law protections for migrant workers that often go beyond federal 
protections such as workers’ compensation,141 this section focuses 
exclusively on federal employment statutes.  Moreover, while there are 
other federal employment law statutes that protect migrant workers such as 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),142 this section focuses on 
three principal workplace statutes affecting migrant workers: (1) the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which provides wage and hour protections for 
employees; (2) the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection 
Act (AWPA), which provides pre-employment and employment protections 
for qualifying agricultural employees; and, (3) Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act (Title VII), which provides employee protections against, among other 
things, discrimination based on national origin, race, religion, and sex. 
1. The Fair Labor Standards Act143  
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, passed in the midst of 
the Great Depression, provides child labor restrictions and baseline wage 
and hour protections for documented and undocumented migrant 
workers.144  FLSA established a national hourly minimum wage in 1938, 
which is currently $7.25 per hour.145  It also mandated that employers pay 
one and one-half times an employee’s regular rate, whatever that may be, 
for hours worked beyond forty each week.146  If an employer violates FLSA 
it must pay back the minimum wages and overtime premiums to the worker 
as well as an equal amount in liquidated damages.147   
 
 141. For a comprehensive discussion of Hoffman Plastics and Workers’ Compensation Laws, see 
Anne Marie O’Donovan, Immigrant Workers and Workers’ Compensation After Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 299 (2006).  For a discussion of the 
impact of Hoffman on state labor and employment law remedies, see Griffith, supra note 113. 
 142. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.  Health and safety is an important issue for low-wage migrant 
workers.  See, e.g., Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 5, at 25 (“Guestworkers toil in some of the 
most dangerous occupations in the United States.  Fatality rates for the agricultural and forestry 
industries, both of which employ large numbers of guestworkers, are more than 10 times the national 
average.”); id. 25–28. 
 143. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.  For comprehensive coverage of FLSA, see FEDERAL LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT & Supp. (Ellen C. Kearns & Monica Gallagher eds. 2007). 
 144. See, e.g., Nan Ellis, Work Is Its Own Reward:  Are Workfare Participant Employees Entitled to 
Protection Under the Fair Labor Standards Act?, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 25 (2003) 
(“Congress adopted the FLSA to relieve the effects of the Depression, by protecting the most vulnerable, 
those unable to negotiate on their own behalf for a living wage, and by preserving competition.”); 
Walter M. Luers, Workfare Wages Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 208 
(1998) (“The Great Depression spurred congressional efforts to create a national minimum wage.”).  See 
also Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels LLC, 576 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re 
Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987) and its statement that “the protections of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act are applicable to citizens and aliens alike and whether the alien is documented or 
undocumented is irrelevant.”). 
 145. 29 U.S.C. § 206. 
 146. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 
 147. 29 U.S.C. § 216.  See also 29 U.S.C. § 260. 
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FLSA, which has been described as a “wallflower” because of its 
obscurity behind the better known Title VII, has been experiencing a 
renaissance as low-wage migrant worker advocates and private counsel 
increasingly bring FLSA suits.148  For undocumented migrant workers, who 
often work at or near the minimum wage, FLSA provides a form of 
protection from sub-standard wages.149  For H-2 visa workers, who often 
incur great costs in transit to the United States, FLSA may require 
employers to pay those costs when they cut into the workers’ minimum 
wages for the first week of employment.150  FLSA’s overtime protections 
are also important for migrant workers.  Some worker advocates say that 
employer overtime violations are so rampant that, in practice, there is 
essentially an “immigrant exception” to FLSA’s overtime law.151   
Not all migrant workers have FLSA minimum wage and overtime 
rights.152  Similar to the NLRA, independent contractors are entirely exempt 
from coverage and agricultural workers and domestic workers are excluded 
from FLSA’s overtime requirements.153  FLSA’s multi-factored “economic 
realities” test154 for determining who is an employee,155 and therefore 
covered by FLSA, and who is an independent contractor, and therefore 
exempt from FLSA, sometimes leads to employer confusion and/or 
 
 148. See Scott Lemond & Rob Carty, The Suddenly En Vogue FLSA:  After 50 Years as a 
Wallflower, She’s Finally Ready to Dance, 44 HOUSTON LAWYER 10, (2006) (“Move over Title VII, n1 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is poised to take over as winner of the employment litigation 
popularity contest.”); Michael Orey, Wage Wars:  Workers—from truck drivers to stockbrokers—are 
winning huge overtime lawsuits, BUS. WEEK (Oct. 1, 2007); Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and 
Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1895 (2007) (“Heightened awareness of degraded 
working conditions and the creative use of law to drive direct action and media campaigns by worker 
centers led to the revived enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).”).   
 149. See Pia Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, What Are the Consequences of an Amnesty for 
Undocumented Immigrants?, 9 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 21, 23 (2004) (“Undocumented immigrants tend 
to be near the bottom of the U.S. skill distribution and are disproportionately employed in low-wage 
jobs.”). 
 150. See Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1242-44 (11th Cir. 2002); Griffith, 
supra note 94, at 409–13.  But see Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels LLC, 2009 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 4796 (5th Cir. La. Feb. 11, 2009) (basing conclusion largely on Department of Labor’s 
interpretation issued in December 2008). 
 151. Email Communication from Daniel Werner, Deputy Director, Southern Poverty Law Center, 
Immigrant Justice Project, (Aug. 17, 2008) (on file with author). 
 152. Some H-1B workers may be excluded from FLSA’s overtime requirements.  See Susan E. 
McPherson & Matthew D. Fridy, Fair Pay Exemptions for you and Your Client, 66 ALA. LAW. 269, 274 
(2005) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.400 through 541.402 and stating that “[b]eing highly dependant on the 
use of a computer to perform one’s work, like an architect or a civil engineer, does not necessarily 
qualify an employee for this exemption.  To qualify, the employee must engage in computer systems 
analysis, programming or other similar computer-related work.”). 
 153. 29 U.S.C. § 213. 
 154. The economic reality test was originally set out in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 
U.S. 722 (1947).   
 155. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (“employee” is “any individual employed by an employer”); 29 U.S.C. § 
203(d) (“employer” is “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation 
to an employee”). 
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abuse.156  In fact, the U.S. government has stated that one of the “most 
common” violations of FLSA occurs when “contractors hire so-called 
independent contractors, who in reality should be considered [FLSA-
covered] employees.”157  Moreover, some H-1B workers perform “white 
collar” jobs that are exempted from FLSA’s overtime law because they are 
“executive, administrative, or professional” employees as FLSA defines 
those terms.158   
FLSA-covered workers have a private right of action to sue the 
employer in court regardless of immigration status.159  FLSA plaintiffs can 
bring representative actions on behalf of themselves and other workers that 
affirmatively “opt-in” to the lawsuit.160  If the worker or workers prevail in 
the lawsuit, the court will require the employer to pay for the worker or 
workers’ attorneys’ fees.161  Attorneys’ fees are part of Congress’s broader 
intent to “encourage private parties to act as ‘private attorneys general’” by 
bringing FLSA complaints.162  While the U.S. Department of Labor has 
authority to enforce FLSA and investigate employee complaints, workers 
are not required to notify the agency in any way before bringing a claim in 
federal court.  As mentioned above, neither the Supreme Court nor 
Congress has spoken on whether IRCA forecloses an undocumented 
worker’s access to FLSA remedies.  So far, the lower courts have largely 
concluded that undocumented workers are eligible for the majority of 
FLSA’s remedies.163  If a worker is known to be undocumented, it is 
unlikely that reinstatement is an available FLSA remedy for an illegal 
retaliatory termination of employment.  This is not an entirely settled area 
of post-Hoffman law, however.  At least one court has suggested that 
reinstatement may be available in some circumstances.  In one federal 
employment law case, for example, a district court concluded that if the 
 
 156. For a broader discussion of misclassification, see L.H. DONAHUE, J.R. LAMARE, & F.B. 
KOTLER, THE COST OF WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE (2007), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports/9/; Smith & Ruckelhaus, supra note 116; Bruce Goldstein 
et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop:  Rediscovering the Statutory 
Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1999). 
 157. U.S. Dept. of Labor, “Fact Sheet No. 013:  Employment Relationship Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA),” (Nov. 2007), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.pdf.  See also Pamela Constable, Advocates 
Speak Up for Illegal Day Laborers Cheated of Wages, WASH. POST, July 8, 2008, at A01.   
 158. See 29 U.S.C. § 213. 
 159. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, “Fact Sheet No. 48:  Application of U.S. Labor Laws to 
Immigrant Workers:  Effect of Hoffman Plastics Decision on Laws Enforced by the Wage and Hour 
Division,” (July 2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs48.pdf. 
 160. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 161. See 29 U.S.C. § 216. 
 162. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 347 n.124 (2005) (citing Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 746 F.2d 4, 11 (D.C. Cir. 
1984)). 
 163. Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
497, 509, 510–11 (2004). 
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employer was allowed to ask the worker to fill out the I-9 employment 
verification form after an illegal retaliatory termination it would “have the 
effect not of enhancing compliance with immigration employment laws, but 
of undermining the enforcement of and compliance with such laws” 
because it would make undocumented workers more attractive to 
employers.164   
2. The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act165 
The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
(AWPA) of 1983 is a relevant statute for many documented and 
undocumented migrants.  Some estimate that almost half of agricultural 
workers in the United States are undocumented migrants.166  Pursuant to 
AWPA, a “migrant” worker is a worker who works in agricultural on a 
temporary or seasonal basis and is required to be away overnight from his 
or her permanent place of residence.167  “Seasonal” workers share the same 
AWPA definition, except that they are not required to be absent overnight 
from their permanent residences.168  Similar to its 1963 predecessor,169 
AWPA responded to well-documented worker abuses in the agricultural 
industry.170  Courts have often described AWPA as a “remedial statute” that 
must “be construed broadly to effect its humanitarian purpose.”171  It 
creates a wide range of industry-specific protections for employees that go 
beyond FLSA’s requirement that workers receive minimum wages and 
overtime premiums.  These protections include certain housing, 
transportation, wage, disclosure, and recordkeeping requirements as well as 
a requirement that farm labor contractors, who often do the recruiting and 
transporting of workers, register with the U.S. Department of Labor.172   
 
 164. See EEOC v. City of Joliet, 239 F.R.D. 490, 492 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“It is well known and 
understood that one of the main motivations for the hiring of undocumented workers is the reality that 
such workers are unlikely to complain if discriminated against, underpaid, overworked or subjected to 
abusive work environments because they fear deportation.  Therefore, safeguarding the rights of such 
workers to enforce laws such as Title VII will, in effect, strengthen our immigration laws by removing 
one of the main motivations for hiring undocumented workers in the first place - one of the stated goals 
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (‘IRCA’).”). 
 165. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. 
 166. Philip Martin, Guestworkers:  New Solution to New Problem? 1 (Pew Hispanic Center, Mar. 
21, 2002). 
 167. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(A). 
 168. 29 U.S.C. § 1802 (10)(A). 
 169. Morante-Navarro v. T&Y Pine Straw, Inc., 350 F.3d 1163, 1168 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The [Farm 
Labor Contractor Registration Act-FLCRA] was the first major federal effort to improve the conditions 
for agricultural laborers . . . .”).  For a provocative expose of the conditions of farm labor before 
Congress enacted FLCRA, see Edward R. Murrow’s documentary, Harvest of Shame (CBS television 
broadcast 1960). 
 170. Morante-Navarro, 350 F.3d 1163, at 1168–70. 
 171. Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc., 993 F.2d 1500, 1505 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 172. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1811–15, 1821–23, 1831–32, 1841–44. 
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Unlike FLSA, AWPA has provisions that specifically address each 
stage of the employment relationship.  AWPA’s disclosure requirements, 
for instance, require that AWPA-covered migrant workers receive accurate 
information about the terms and conditions of employment at the 
recruitment stage.  AWPA’s protections acknowledge that there is often a 
lot at stake during the recruitment stage, especially when a worker is 
deciding whether to travel great distances for an employment opportunity.  
Moreover, pursuant to AWPA, an agricultural employer is bound by the 
“working arrangement” he or she makes with employees and must pay the 
employees’ wages when due.  To respond to the sometimes squalid living 
conditions on farms and unsafe transportation methods, AWPA followed its 
predecessor and regulates the housing as well as the daily transportation to 
and from work of AWPA-covered migrant workers.173 
Somewhat counter intuitively, AWPA does not protect H-2A 
agricultural workers under any circumstances but does protect 
undocumented migrants and H-2B workers who fall within its 
definitions.174  The AWPA definition of “agricultural” is generally broader 
than the definition of “agricultural” applied in the H-2 visa program.175  
Therefore, AWPA can apply to H-2B workers that are “non-agricultural” 
according to the H-2B program but are “agricultural” according to AWPA.  
Forestry workers are an example of workers who are counter intuitively 
often both AWPA-covered and “non-agricultural” H-2B visa holders.   
AWPA-covered workers have a private right of action to bring a claim 
in court against agricultural employers, agricultural associations, and farm 
labor contractors regardless of their immigration status.176  AWPA plaintiffs 
can bring class actions on behalf of other employees that do not 
affirmatively opt out of the lawsuit.  Prevailing AWPA plaintiffs can 
receive either statutory damages of $500 for each AWPA violation or actual 
damages for each violation.177  Unlike FLSA, however, even if AWPA 
plaintiffs prevail in their AWPA claims they do not have the right to 
recover their attorneys’ fees.  Similar to FLSA-covered workers, they can 
also make complaints to the U.S. Department of Labor but are in no way 
required to do so before pursuing a court action. 
 
 173. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1823, 1841.   
 174. See, e.g., Martinez v. Mecca Farms, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 601, 605 (D. Fla. 2002) (concluding that 
undocumented workers are AWPA covered); 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8) & (10)(excluding H-2A workers from 
AWPA coverage). 
 175. For the definition of agriculture, see 29 U.S.C. § 1802(3). 
 176. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, “Fact Sheet No. 48:  Application of U.S. Labor Laws to 
Immigrant Workers:  Effect of Hoffman Plastics Decision on Laws Enforced by the Wage and Hour 
Division,” (July 2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs48.pdf. 
 177. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c). 
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While there are only a few cases that consider the effect of the 
Supreme Court’s Hoffman decision on AWPA remedies, early signs 
indicate that courts are concluding that AWPA’s remedies, besides 
reinstatement, are still available regardless of immigration status.  If 
undocumented workers experience an AWPA violation they are still likely 
to be eligible for AWPA’s compensatory and statutory damages.178 
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act179 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was passed during the 
heyday of the civil rights movement, forbids specified employers from 
discriminating against employees based on national origin, race, color, 
religion, or sex.  Title VII forbids employers from taking an adverse 
employment action against an employee because of his or her membership 
in one of these protected classes.  By definition, migrant workers fall into at 
least one of Title VII’s protected categories because they are from a foreign 
country.  For example, in several recent cases, migrant workers have 
complained that their employers have discriminated against them based on 
their national origin through unnecessary “English only” rules and other 
adverse employment actions.180  Moreover, in Chellen v.  John Pickle Co., a 
federal court recently concluded, among other things, that H-1B skilled 
workers from India experienced “a hostile work environment characterized 
by abusive language, demeaning job assignments, and threats and 
intimidation based on their national origin.”181  
Title VII also provides migrant workers with protections against sex 
discrimination.  In a recent case, for example, female H-2B workers 
claimed that their assignment to the H-2B visa program, rather than the H-
2A visa program, constituted unlawful sex discrimination.  The lead 
plaintiff claimed “that she was qualified to work in an H-2A position and 
would have preferred such an assignment because of its preferable 
benefits. . . [and] that. . . there were men with similar or lesser 
qualifications that were recruited False [for the H-2A program and that she] 
was neither offered such a position nor informed that such positions 
existed.”182  Moreover, in January, 2007, a large Florida vegetable and fruit 
 
 178. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 163, at 509–11 (stating that AWPA wage and statutory damages 
are likely to still be available); Martinez v. Mecca Farms, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 601, 604-05 (S.D. Fla. 2002).  
See generally Centeno-Bernuy v. Perry, 302 F. Supp. 2d 128, 131 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.   
 180. See, e.g., Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007); Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 
F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 181. 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1264 (N.D. Okla. 2006).  For another Title VII case involving H-1B 
workers, see EEOC v. Technocrest Sys., 448 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 182. Olvera-Morales v. Int’l Labor Mgmt. Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13094, *3 (M.D.N.C. 
2008). 
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company, which had been sued for Title VII sexual harassment violations 
against female agricultural employees, settled the case for $215,000.183 
Unlike FLSA and AWPA, Title VII-covered workers are required first 
to make a timely complaint with a federal agency or state agency where 
applicable before filing a complaint in federal court.  The relevant agency is 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Once the EEOC 
has a chance to investigate the matter, it decides whether to bring suit in 
federal court or to issue a “right to sue” letter that grants permission to the 
complainant to sue in federal court within a specified period of time.  
Therefore, unlike the NLRA, a Title VII plaintiff does ultimately have a 
private right of action in federal court.  Title VII plaintiffs can bring class 
action suits on behalf of similarly situated employees.  Title VII allows for 
a wide array of both compensatory and punitive damages for violations.  
Similar to FLSA, if a Title VII plaintiff prevails, the employer must pay for 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.   
While the availability of Title VII’s back pay remedy to undocumented 
workers is still very much in question, a growing number of courts have 
concluded that other Title VII remedies, such as compensatory and punitive 
damages, are available regardless of immigration status.184  Moreover, the 
EEOC has pronounced that undocumented workers are still Title-VII 
protected despite the Hoffman decision.185  Scholars analyzing agency 
statements and current case law generally agree that “undocumented 
workers appear still to be eligible for relief .  .  .  including unpaid wages 
for time actually worked, declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys fees, 
and punitive, compensatory, and liquidated damages.”186  As mentioned 
above, there is less agreement about the availability of Title VII’s back pay 
remedy after the Supreme Court’s Hoffman decision.  The few courts to 
consider whether back pay is still available to undocumented workers in the 
Title VII context have arrived at mixed results.187   
 
 183. For an article referring to the case, see Haitian Farmworkers Settle Sexual Harassment Lawsuit 
Against Major Florida Fruit and Vegetable Wholesaler, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 24, 2007, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5554/is_200701./ai_n21887795.  For reports that sexual 
harassment is a problem for female agricultural workers, see, e.g., Mary Klaus, Event focuses on sexual 
abuse of female migrant workers, PATRIOT NEWS, Apr. 30, 2008, at B01 (“Monica Ramirez, project 
director for ‘Esperanza:  The Immigrant Women’s Legal Initiative,’ said victims often stay silent 
because they fear further violence, harm to their families and deportation.  She said 90 percent of female 
farm workers surveyed call sexual harassment on the job a problem.”).   
 184. See Wishnie, supra note 163, at 509-11.  See generally Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, 
Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB:  Strategies for Protecting 
Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473 (2005). 
 185. See EEOC, “EEOC Reaffirms Commitment to Protecting Undocumented Workers From 
Discrimination,” 6/28/02, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/6-28-02.html. 
 186. Wishnie, supra note 163. 
 187. See Christine N. Cimini, Ask, Don’t Tell:  Ethical Issues Surrounding Undocumented Workers’ 
Status in Employment Litigation, 61 STAN. L. REV. 355, 384 (2008) (“A couple of courts have 
questioned the applicability of Hoffman to the Title VII context altogether, while others found that while 
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4. IRCA Ambiguity and Employment Laws 
While a growing number of courts have generally limited the reach of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hoffman decision, Hoffman undoubtedly affects 
undocumented workers’ incentives to bring lawsuits and enforce their 
workplace rights.188  For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that probing immigration status during litigation may 
dissuade both undocumented and documented workers from bringing legal 
actions against their employers.189  Undocumented workers may fear 
detention or deportation and documented workers may fear that the 
immigration status of their friends and family may be called into question 
or that their own recently-acquired immigration authorization may be 
jeopardized in the lawsuit.190  Suggesting that such a probe would damage 
the efficacy of Title VII’s main enforcer, the employee, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated that “Congress intended to empower individuals to 
act as private attorneys general in enforcing the provisions of Title VII.”191   
The ambiguity about the full effect of the Supreme Court’s Hoffman 
decision allows the fight over the relevance of immigration status to play a 
role in earlier stages of the litigation, before remedies are awarded.  During 
the discovery phase of litigation, when the parties exchange relevant 
documents, request answers to interrogatories, and conduct depositions, 
many employers argue that they have a right to know the immigration status 
of the plaintiff.  The Hoffman decision, they contend, made immigration 
status relevant to the question of which remedies are available and therefore 
relevant to the litigation.  Undocumented worker legal advocates have 
successfully countered these arguments on a number of occasions.  So far 
“[c]ourts have overwhelmingly decided to prohibit the disclosure of 
immigration status in the context of employment-related civil litigation, 
often citing the highly prejudicial impact of the disclosure compared to its 
relatively small probative value.”192  Nonetheless, the threat of Hoffman 
during these earlier stages of litigation has a profound effect on the process 
and can limit the assurances that plaintiff attorneys can provide to their 
clients.  It can dissuade workers from making complaints even in the face of 
some of “the strongest claims for workplace violations.”193  
 
Hoffman may limit the back-pay remedy, it does not foreclose other remedies available under Title 
VII.”); Ho & Chang, supra note 184, at 500–03. 
 188. Wishnie, supra note 88, at 1448 n.14. 
 189. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 190. Id. at 1065. 
 191. Id. at 1065–66. 
 192. Cimini, supa note 187, at 382–83 (citing relevant cases). 
 193. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery:  Immigrant Workers and the Fifth 
Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27, 42 (2008) (“Without an effective strategy for answering the 
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C. Other U.S. Statutes Protecting Migrant Workers  
There are several federal statutes that are not typically thought of as 
part of the traditional employment law area but that may apply to some 
migrant workers and afford them rights.  For migrant workers that are 
victims of labor trafficking, for instance, a federal anti-trafficking statute 
provides a number of criminal and civil protections.  Trafficking is “the 
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person 
for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the 
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or 
slavery.”194  Since the enactment of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2003 (TVPRA), victims of labor trafficking have 
had a private right of action to bring a case against their traffickers in 
federal court.195  The immigration status of the trafficking victim is not 
relevant to the outcome of the criminal or civil proceedings.196  A 
trafficking victim who is successful in his or her lawsuit can recover, 
among other things, pain and suffering damages.197  To date, the TVPRA 
has not been used extensively in the labor trafficking area but migrant 
worker advocates contend that it will have increasing relevance in the 
upcoming years.198 
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) provides aliens, including migrant 
workers regardless of immigration status, with a right to bring suits in 
federal court for a tort that is committed in violation of the law of nations or 
a treaty of the United States.199  The key limiting factor for these claims, of 
course, is that the case has to involve a tort that fits this description.  
According to a legal expert on ATCA, ATCA may protect migrant workers 
when trafficking, slavery, or severe labor rights violations are involved.200  
A recent federal district court case in California provides an example of a 
 
status-based questions born of Hoffman, immigrants will continue to opt out of civil litigation, unwilling 
to assert even the strongest claims for workplace violations.”). 
 194. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(B). 
 195. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595. 
 196. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Compensation for 
Trafficked and Exploited Persons in the OSCE Region 130 (2008).  For discussion of the three different 
ways a trafficking victim can recover, see id. at 130–38. 
 197. For discussion of all remedies, see id. at 139. 
 198. Id. at 152 (“Although the private right of action created by the TVPRA is untested, civil 
attorneys have already brought suit against traffickers using a variety of legal theories and have won 
substantial judgments.”).  If the federal government certifies a labor trafficking victim “as a victim of a 
severe form of trafficking” the victim can receive legal representation through organizations that receive 
federal funding.  Id. at 151–52, 160. 
 199. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.  For a further discussion of ATCA claims see Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien 
Tort Statute:  Civil Society and Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971 (2004); Natalie L. 
Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA as a Proxy for Environmental Claims, 6 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2003). 
 200. Email communication from Natalie L. Bridgeman (Sept. 16, 2008) (on file with author). 
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possible claim under ATCA.  The migrant worker plaintiffs claimed, among 
other things, that  
defendants fraudulently induced them to come to the United States from 
India on false promises that they would be provided an education and 
employment opportunities, but then forced them to work long hours 
under arduous conditions for pay far below minimum wage and in 
violation of overtime laws, and sexually abused and physical beat 
them.201 
The court stated that the claim “may rest upon any ‘specific, universal 
and obligatory’ norm recognized by the international community.”202  It 
found plaintiffs’ claims that defendants engaged in trafficking, debt 
bondage, and forced labor were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.203  
Due to these limitations, ATCA claims are more common in migrant 
worker lawsuits alleging severe mistreatment.   
While this article focuses on the domestic legal system, migrant 
workers may also have some recourse in international arenas such as the 
International Labor Organization, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
and the National Office of Administration of the North American 
Agreement on Free Trade.204  These avenues are sometimes limited because 
of the failure of the United States to sign treaties that may be helpful to 
migrant workers and because the domestic enforcement of international 
standards is often difficult.  For example, while the United States has signed 
an International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention on child labor and 
forced labor and a United Nations Convention on Trafficking it has refused 
to sign the ILO’s Conventions specifically addressing migrant workers.205  
These avenues are somewhat limited with respect to providing individual 
relief for migrant workers because international bodies largely do not have 
an ability to reach specific employers in the United States.  Even when 
international law cannot directly reach employers in the United States, 
however, international legal challenges often provide political pressure that 
may help migrant workers more broadly and international laws can serve as 
a source of “aspirational law” for the future.206 
 
 201. Doe I v. Reddy, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26120, *12 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 202. Id. at *32. 
 203. For limitations on ATCA claims, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) 
(narrowing ATCA claims by disallowing claims “for violations of any international norm with less 
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when 
[ATCA] was enacted” in 1789). 
 204. Griffith, supra note 94, at 384–85 n.8-10 (citing relevant scholarship). 
 205. See OSCE, supra note 196, at 128. 
 206. See generally Philip Harvey, Aspirational Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 701 (2004). 
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III. MIGRANT WORKER ADVOCACY 
In the last decade, advocacy on behalf of migrant workers has 
intensified.  Migrant workers and their advocates generally work on three 
levels to try to improve working conditions in the United States.  There are 
worker groups such as labor unions, worker centers, and community groups 
that focus on organizing migrant workers through a wide array of strategies.  
There are non-profit legal groups and attorneys that litigate on behalf of 
migrant workers in individual complaints as well as representative actions 
on behalf of groups of migrant workers.  Finally, there are policy advocacy 
groups that focus on legislation and regulations that may have an impact on 
migrant workers.  Acknowledging that these three different tiers of work are 
not mutually exclusive and advocacy groups often span more than one, 
below I briefly lay out the main trends in each. 
A. Worker Groups 
There are a number of worker groups that organize migrant workers 
regardless of immigration status and others that focus their organizing on 
documented migrant workers.207  As part of their efforts to revitalize the 
ailing U.S. labor movement,208 some unions have come to view the 
mistreatment of low-wage migrant workers as a threat to the workplace 
rights of all workers209 and have targeted documented and undocumented 
immigrants in union organizing campaigns.  For instance, in recent efforts 
to organize the unexportable hotel industry, UNITE HERE “excelled at 
organizing immigrant workers, who constitute a disproportionate share of 
hotel employees.”210  Moreover, in 2005 the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) successfully organized 4,700 janitors in 
Houston, Texas, by focusing “on two groups [the union] says are pivotal if 
labor is to grow again: low-wage workers and immigrants.”211 
There are also many new organizing efforts outside of the labor 
movement.  Recent scholarship has documented the many forms of 
“alternative worker organizations” that have sprung up in recent years.  
Many of these organizations serve both documented and undocumented 
migrant workers.  Worker centers, for instance, pursue new forms of 
 
 207. See generally Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States:  
Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385, 396 (2005).  
 208. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Union Claims Texas Victory With Janitors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
28, 2005, at A4 (stating that “the percentage of private-sector workers in unions has dropped to 7.9 
percent”). 
 209. See, e.g., Ruth Milkman, Introduction, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS:  THE CHALLENGE FOR 
UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 1, 1–2, 10–11 (Ruth Milkman ed. 2000). 
 210. See, e.g., Harold Meyerson, Taking On the Hotels, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2006, at A17. 
 211. Greenhouse, supra note 208. 
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community-labor organizing to respond to the needs of low-wage and 
immigrant workers.212  Worker organizations are not uniform in their 
structures or goals.213  There are some that target a particular geographical 
area, an industry, or an ethnic group and others that respond more 
organically to the needs of the active members or participants.  While the 
role of alternative worker organizations in the broader movement for 
economic justice is not entirely uncontroversial among worker advocates, 
many commentators see non-traditional worker organizations as important 
experiments that can aid efforts to strengthen working class movements.214 
Neither labor organizations nor the vast majority of alternative worker 
organizations mentioned above have made H-1B worker organizing a 
priority.215  Nonetheless, there are a handful of recent efforts that target 
documented H-2 migrant workers.  The New Orleans Workers’ Center for 
Racial Justice, for instance, recently created the Alliance of Guest Workers 
for Dignity (the Alliance) to organize and provide services for H-2B 
workers who are in New Orleans to work on post-Katrina reconstruction 
efforts.216  In 2008, the Alliance engaged in a month-long hunger strike “to 
highlight their allegations that a guest worker program is abusing foreign 
laborers and shutting Americans out of decent jobs.”217  Moreover, the 
Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) has developed a strategy to 
organize H-2A agricultural guest workers in North Carolina.  In 2004 
FLOC “won union recognition for roughly 8500 guest workers employed 
by the North Carolina Growers Association (‘NCGA’).”218  The contract 
“dramatically changes the landscape for the H-2A workers it covers” by, 
among other things, creating a grievance procedure and giving FLOC 
power to oversee recruitment in Mexico.219 
 
 212. See generally JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS:  ORGANIZING NEW COMMUNITIES AT THE 
EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS:  THE FIGHT FOR 
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking:  Immigrant Workers, the 
Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See generally Hyde, supra note 57. 
 215. Id. at 521–22 (describing H-1B advocacy group as focused on policy and stating that “neither 
the AFL-CIO, nor any of its affiliates, has made efforts to organize H-1B workers.”). 
 216. For a description of the project, see 3http://www.nowcrj.org/about-2/alliance-of-guest-
workers-for-dignity. 
 217. Gaouette, supra note 101. 
 218. Jennifer Hill, Binational Guestworker Unions:  Moving Guestworkers into the House of Labor, 
35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 309-310 (2008).  See also Elisabeth Malkin, Graft Mars the Recruitment of 
Mexican Guest Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2007, at A3 (“[FLOC] opened its office in Monterrey 
two years ago to help the 6,000 Mexican guest workers it represents in a collective bargaining 
agreement with the North Carolina Growers Association, a group of 650 farmers.”). 
 219. Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 576 (2007).  See 
also id.  (“The UFW agreement with Global Horizons, a labor contractor, was only announced in the 
spring of 2006, and it is too soon to know how it will work on behalf of the nearly 4000 workers it 
covers.”). 
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B. Legal Groups and Lawyers 
Legal groups and lawyers play a significant role as advocates on behalf 
of migrant workers.  Both a change to legal services funding in 1996 and 
the Supreme Court’s Hoffman decision, however, affected the way legal 
groups and lawyers conduct legal advocacy on behalf of migrant workers.  
These changes fostered separation between advocacy for documented 
workers and advocacy for workers regardless of immigration status.220  The 
legal services appropriations law was changed in 1996 to disallow legal 
services offices, which receive any federal funding, from using any of its 
funds to represent undocumented workers.221  Since 1996, some federally-
funded legal services offices continue to provide legal representation for H-
2A agricultural workers and H-2B forestry workers.  Meanwhile a host of 
legal organizations that do not receive federal funding serve both H-2B and 
other migrant workers regardless of immigration status.222  Because many 
groups felt that the Supreme Court’s 2002 Hoffman decision posed a serious 
threat to workplace protections for undocumented workers, in recent years 
they have become increasingly coordinated in their efforts.223 
Lawyers have also figured prominently in some of the worker 
organizing efforts described in the section above.  In fact there is a growing 
“literature on ways that law and lawyering can advance (or retard) the 
process of organizing” among workers.224  Some unions have turned to 
legal challenges “both as an organizing strategy and as a matter of 
philosophical commitment.”225  Moreover, some alternative worker 
organizations utilize legal cases as an element of their overall strategy.226  
For instance, a recent article noted that, “[b]ecause of the high incidence of 
legal abuse among immigrant workers, legal services emerged as a 
significant component of the worker centers’ agenda.”227  The partnership 
 
 220. Cummings, supra note 98, at 913–24. 
 221. Id. at 914. 
 222. Legal organizations, such as the Workers’ Rights Law Center of New York, the Northwest 
Workers’ Justice Project, and the Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center of San Francisco, 
represent migrant workers in litigation against their employers regardless of their immigration status.  
Other groups, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Immigrant Justice Project, were created 
largely to bring class action litigation on behalf of migrant workers.  The National Employment Law 
Project (NELP), among other things, provides strategic resources for lawyers working on individual and 
class action cases on behalf of low-wage and migrant workers. 
 223. See Cummings, supra note 98, at 914 (describing post-Hoffman collaborations between law 
school clinics, worker centers, and other legal groups). 
 224. Fran Ansley, Doing Policy from Below:  Worker Solidarity and the Prospects for Immigration 
Reform, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 101, 110 (2008). 
 225. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 26, at 59.  See generally Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor:  
The United Farm Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union 
Organizing Today, 8 U. PENN. J. LAB. EMPL. L. 1 (2005). 
 226. See generally Ashar, supra note 148. 
 227. Cummings, supra note 98, at 917. 
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between lawyers and workers has also given rise to the increased use of 
employment law as a means to protect new worker organizing efforts.  
Indeed, Benjamin Sachs has illustrated that, as a response to the declining 
relevance of the NLRA, “workers and their lawyers are turning to 
employment statutes like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as the legal guardians of their efforts to 
organize and act collectively.”228 
C. Legislative Advocacy Groups 
There are legislative advocacy groups for low-skilled migrant workers 
as well as for skilled migrant workers.  In part because the issues related to 
each are so different, advocates for low-skilled migrant workers largely do 
not work in coordination with advocates for skilled migrant workers.  With 
the national immigration debate looming large over the past few years, 
legislative advocacy groups such as Farmworker Justice, the National 
Immigration Law Center, and the Southern Poverty Law Center’s 
Immigrant Justice Project, have made extensive criticisms and proposals 
regarding legislation that would affect low-wage migrant workers.229  While 
these groups and the large network of their collaborators focus on a wide 
range of legislative proposals that affect low-wage migrant workers, one of 
their main foci is advocacy related to the contours of future guest worker 
programs.  Many of these proposals advocate for the existence of paths to 
permanent residency for guest workers, visa portability, and the payment of 
transportation costs at the beginning of the employment period.  Recently, 
migrant worker advocates were successful in their efforts to stall new H-2A 
regulations that were finalized in President Bush’s final month in office.230  
Moreover, as mentioned above, international legal challenges often play a 
part in broader migrant worker advocacy efforts.  For instance, a number of 
groups brought a complaint pursuant to the labor side agreements of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement that challenged the H-2A visa 
program.231 
The Immigrant Support Network (ISN) has worked on legislative 
issues on behalf of skilled migrants with H-1B visas.232  While visa holders 
 
 228. Sachs, supra note 29, at 2687. 
 229. For instance, over thirty groups worked together to submit extensive comments about proposed 
H-2B regulatory changes.  See http://www.friendsfw.org/h-2B/DOL_H-2b_2008-07-07_Comment.pdf.  
See also Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 5. 
 230. See Farmworker Justice Web site, 
http://www.fwjustice.org/Immigration_Labor/h2anews.htm#court.  See also Greenhouse, supra note 82. 
 231. Lisa Guerra, Modern-Day Servitude:  A Look at the H-2A Programs Purposes, Regulations, 
and Realities, 29 VT. L. REV. 185, 211 (2004). 
 232. Hyde, supra note 57, at 521.   
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originally spearheaded the effort,233 “[i]t is funded largely by successful 
Indian entrepreneurs .  .  .  who derive no direct benefit from its success, but 
are largely motivated by pride in the achievements of their compatriots.”234  
Among other things ISN has advocated for improvements in the process 
toward permanent residency status and the portability of the visa.235  ISN 
has had some success in securing legislative improvements on behalf of H-
1B workers.236 
IV. INTERSTICES OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND  
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
This article highlights an aspect of the immigration debate in the 
United States that is too often overlooked.  Much debate focuses on paths to 
legalization and border security, but far too little attention is paid to the 
relationship between immigration regulation and the regulation of 
workplace conditions for employees.  For instance, few examine whether, 
or to what extent, IRCA’s workplace-based immigration enforcement 
should affect the workplace law rights and remedies of employees or 
workplace law regulation more broadly.  Moreover, little attention is paid to 
the effect of such things as visa portability restrictions and employer 
sponsorship of legal residency applications on workplace law enforcement.  
Despite this absence in the national debate, the above illuminates that U.S. 
immigration law creates both tensions and ambiguities with respect to labor 
and employment law enforcement that demand attention. 
The way U.S. immigration law regulates temporary worker visa 
programs as well as how it regulates the employment of undocumented 
workers may incur a cost on the future viability of the U.S. labor and 
employment law regime.237  The regime, initiated during the New Deal’s 
expansion of federal power in the 1930s and complemented during the civil 
rights movement in the 1960s, is largely based on the universalist rationale 
that employees must have the same baseline individual and collective rights 
nationally in order to avoid creating a sub-class of workers.238  The 
 
 233. Id. at 521–22. 
 234. Hyde, supra note 207, at 396. 
 235. See generally Hyde, supra note 57, at 521–24. 
 236. Id. 
 237. For an argument that both immigration law enforcement and workplace law enforcement are 
suffering because of the “legal system’s treatment of illegal workers” see Developments in the Law—
Jobs and Borders:  Legal Protections for Illegal Workers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2171, 2225, 2246—47 
(2005). 
 238. See generally Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945); Wishnie, supra note 88, at 
1459–61.  See also id. at 1461 (describing U.S. immigration law as “distorting the labor and 
employment schemes through which Congress intended to supply basic workplace protections for all 
workers.”); Rachael S. Simon, Workers on the March:  Work Stoppages, Public Rallies, and the 
National Labor Relations Act, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 1273, 1281 (2007) (“Clearly, when a large segment 
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Supreme Court, for instance, stated the following before concluding that 
undocumented workers are NLRA “employees” and therefore enjoy NLRA 
rights: 
If undocumented alien employees were excluded from participation in 
union activities and from protections against employer intimidation, 
there would be created a subclass of workers without a comparable stake 
in the collective goals of their legally resident co-workers, thereby 
eroding the unity of all the employees and impeding effective collective 
bargaining.239 
To advance this overarching goal of avoiding a sub-class of workers 
U.S. labor and employment laws rely on union or worker-initiated 
complaints more than government-initiated workplace inspections.240  The 
promotion of private attorneys general and the protection of collective 
action are central to workplace law regulation in the United States.241  
Workplace protections, therefore, are undermined when a subset of 
employees—documented and undocumented migrant workers—are either 
too fearful to complain or are not sufficiently motivated to bring valid 
complaints.  The intense dependency of H visa workers on their sponsoring 
employer greatly reduces the incentives for making legitimate workplace 
law complaints.  Moreover, IRCA’s restrictions on the reinstatement and 
NLRA back pay remedy, as well as ambiguity about the relevance of 
immigration status to the availability of other labor and employment law 
remedies, often makes it risky to complain.  This reduces incentives for 
undocumented workers to file workplace law complaints. 
I join others who have contended that “Congress must act soon to 
address in good faith the many tensions and fissures in the labor-
immigration amalgam.”242  While “legal tinkering” may be insufficient, 
legislative change that resolves tensions between immigration law and labor 
 
of the workforce is denied basic protections, the rights of all employees are threatened…It is impossible 
to imagine that the [Hoffman] Court intended to relegate unauthorized workers to an even deeper sub-
class.”). 
 239. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 192 (1984).  See also Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 379 
U.S. App. D.C. 318 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 240. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523 (1994) (“We noted that a Title VII 
plaintiff… is ‘the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate ‘a policy that Congress considered of the 
highest priority.’”). 
 241. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 193, at 45 (2008) (“From combating sweatshop 
conditions to investigating labor law violations and enforcing wage laws, many federal agencies rely 
almost entirely on employee complaints.”). 
 242. Duff, supra note 127, at 150.  See generally id. (arguing, among other things, that NLRA 
protects of immigration rallies in some circumstances).  See also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, 
Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1371 (2009) (noting the 
“disarray” in this area of law and “the need for a coherent framework for evaluating the future rights of 
unauthorized workers.”). 
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and employment law could nonetheless take a step in the right direction.243  
Thus, as the United States deliberates about the militarization of the border 
and legalization opportunities for undocumented migrants, the impact that 
immigration law has on the labor and employment law regime should not 
be overlooked.  The regime’s intent to protect collective action among 
employees is threatened every day that undocumented workers have less 
adequate recourse for labor law violations than their documented 
counterparts.  The regime’s intent to create a baseline of standards in the 
workplace is threatened every day that documented migrant workers are not 
paid their lawfully earned wages but are afraid that a complaint might 
jeopardize their ability to remain in the United States or to return to the 
United States as a guest worker in the future.  It is threatened every day that 
undocumented migrant workers are paid less than the federal minimum 
wage but are afraid to make a FLSA complaint, are living in tattered and 
unsanitary trailers but are afraid to make an AWPA complaint, and are 
experiencing workplace discrimination based on their membership in a 
protected class but are afraid to make a Title VII complaint.  Admittedly, 
not all workers will complain even when they experience severe workplace 
abuse.  However, the current atmosphere of ambiguity and disincentives to 
complain or engage in collective activity effectively create the conditions 
for a sub-class of workers that threaten the living and working standards of 
domestic and migrant workers alike. 
  
 
 243. Id. at 151 (referring to Jennifer Gordon’s transnational strategy for regulating migrant 
workers). 
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